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Live Poultry Market 
Closure and Control 
of Avian Influenza 
A(H7N9),  
Shanghai, China
To the Editor: China reported its 
first human infections with avian in-
fluenza A(H7N9) virus in late March 
2013 (1). In the following weeks, 131 
human infections were confirmed; 33 
occurred in Shanghai (http://www.
moh.gov.cn). Because infection with 
this novel virus had a high fatality rate 
and posed a pandemic risk, Shanghai 
disease control authorities launched 
rapid investigations to identify the 
source of the infections. Migratory 
birds, mammals, poultry, and humans 
could be potential reservoirs of H7 
subtype avian influenza viruses (2,3), 
so all of these possibilities were simul-
taneously evaluated immediately after 
the discovery of the novel virus.
To investigate human-to-human 
transmission, we evaluated 45 close 
contacts of the first 6 reported case-
patients. The only suspected human-
to-human transmission was in 1 fam-
ily cluster with 2 confirmed cases. 
Intensive follow-up monitoring (20 
contacts of this cluster and 25 of the 
other 4 case-patients) did not identify 
any further infections, which suggests 
that sustained human-to-human trans-
mission did not occur.
Migratory birds are natural res-
ervoirs for avian influenza viruses 
(2,4), and Shanghai is in the eastern 
Asia–Australian migratory shorebird 
flyway. Thus, transmission of these 
viruses from wild birds to humans is 
possible. The Shanghai forestry au-
thority has conducted surveillance for 
influenza virus among migratory birds 
since 2004. During January 2010–
April 2013, a total of 884 throat/cloa-
cal swab, serum, and fecal samples 
from 496 birds were tested, and no 
infections with influenza viruses of 
subtypes H7 or N9 were found. Af-
ter human infections with influenza 
A(H7N9) virus occurred, an addition-
al 229 samples were collected from 
migratory birds at Chongming Island, 
Shanghai Zoo, and Shanghai Wildlife 
Park. All were negative for the virus.
Avian influenza surveillance in 
domesticated animals (e.g., minks, 
raccoons, tigers, and pigs) in high-risk 
regions of Shanghai has been conduct-
ed since 1995. During 2010–2012, a 
total of 13,691 samples from these an-
imals were tested, and all were nega-
tive for H7 subtype influenza viruses. 
After human infections with influenza 
A(H7N9) virus were identified, anoth-
er 1,129 samples were collected from 
domesticated mammals for enhanced 
surveillance; all were negative for H7 
subtype influenza viruses.
Live poultry was also consid-
ered a potential source of influenza 
A(H7N9) infection because poultry 
in wet markets have been previously 
found to be infected with H7 sub-
type avian influenza viruses (5–7). 
Shanghai residents could be exposed 
to influenza A(H7N9) virus from live 
poultry in 2 ways: by raising poultry at 
home or by visiting live poultry mar-
kets (LPMs). To assess the risk from 
home-raised poultry, we collected 
405 blood, cloacal/throat swab, and 
environmental samples from poultry 
raised in family courtyards or in com-
munities surrounding the residences 
of the first 6 identified case-patients. 
The samples were tested for antibod-
ies to H7 subtype viruses and RNA for 
subtype H7N9 virus, and all results 
were negative.
Previous studies have shown that 
LPMs are potential locations for virus 
transmission through human-poultry 
contact (8,9). Our field investigation 
of the 6 initially confirmed influenza 
A(H7N9) case-patients revealed that 
2 had visited LPMs, 2 had direct con-
tact with live poultry from LPMs, and 
1 had experienced both exposures. To 
assess the risk for infection at LPMs, 
we collected 280 water, soil, cloacal 
swab, and throat swab samples from 
the LPMs surrounding the locations of 
the initial 6 cases. PCR testing found 
that 20 samples were positive for in-
fluenza A(H7N9) virus. These results 
indicate that the human case-patients 
were most likely infected from poultry 
in LPMs.
On the basis of the epidemiologic 
and laboratory evidence, the Shang-
hai municipal government temporar-
ily closed all 464 LPMs on April 6, 
2013. The markets were cleaned and 
disinfected, and relevant authorities in 
the neighboring provinces were noti-
fied of the action and requested not 
to transport live poultry to Shanghai. 
The municipal government reim-
bursed the poultry traders and raisers 
for these measures.
After the closure of LPMs, 4 ad-
ditional human influenza A(H7N9) 
cases were detected in Shanghai with-
in the first 7-day incubation period, 
and no new cases were detected dur-
ing the rest of 2013, although other 
influenza virus subtypes continued 
to be detected. Meanwhile, in other 
provinces where closure of LPMs was 
not implemented in a timely manner, 
31 cases were reported during the first 
incubation period and 13 during the 
second incubation period (Figure). In 
addition, Shi et al. reported that iso-
lates from the LPMs showed 99.1%–
99.9% nucleotide sequence homology 
with isolates from 2 of the first 6 hu-
man case-patients (10), which further 
indicates that the virus spread from 
infected poultry in the LPMs.
The closure of LPMs after epide-
miology and laboratory investigations 
proved timely and effective in the con-
trol of human infection with this novel 
virus. In early 2014, Shanghai lifted 
the ban on LPMs. Eight new influenza 
A(H7N9) cases were identified in ear-
ly January 2014, but LPMs were again 
closed on January 31, 2014, and no 
further cases have been reported. The 
long-term effectiveness of the LPM 
closures remains to be determined.
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